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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

THE THEORY OF DIFFERENTIALS IN RELATION TO

THE THEORY OF DIFFERENTIALS

BY

JOHN W. BARNES

JOHN W. BARNES

Class of 1932

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

1932

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TO

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

p7439

Roman Batai Adair

(Th.B., Gordon College, 1930)

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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THE THEORY OF EXPERIENCE IN RELIGIOUS REALISM,

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

INTRODUCTION.

This thesis falls within the field of realistic type of modern thought in its most recent development. This is critical realism with a positive religious tendency, a contemporary philosophical interest in morality and religion given the terminology of "religious realism". The problem is to determine the place of moral experience in the thought of religious realists. (1)

The method of approach to this problem is to investigate the important writings of some representative thinkers in the field, and to systematize their interpretations of experience with special reference to their bearing in morality and religion. The procedure will take the following course:

1. To endeavor to understand experience in the light of religious realistic view of the world as a whole.
2. To determine the nature of consciousness in the light of this world view, with reference to moral experience.
3. To interpret their view of moral experience in the light of their epistemology, bearing on the problem of knowledge and truth.

(1) This thesis was inspired by the reading of the book entitled Religious Realism, a cooperative work edited by D.C. Macintosh. Among the writers in this volume studied for this thesis are: J.E. Boodin, W.P. Montague, J.B. Pratt, A.K. Rogers, H.N. Wieman, W.K. Wright and the editor.

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4. To determine what constitutes character in the light of their ethical principles.

5. To determine the place of religion in moral experience.

Religious realism endeavors to understand and interpret reality in general and religion in particular by way of an empirical and pragmatic approach or in the words of William James "radical empiricism". In other words, experience is the key to the objectivity, reality and existence of God as the embodiment of the supreme values of life in the universe. D. C. Macintosh as one of the leading representatives of this type of thought characterizes it thus:

Religious Realism---means centrally the view that a religious Object, such as may appropriately be called God, exists independently of our consciousness thereof, and is yet related to us in such a way that through reflection on experience in general and religious experience in particular ---it is possible for us to gain either---adequately verified knowledge or---a practically valuable and theoretically permissible faith not only that that religious Object exists but also, within whatever limits, as to what its nature is. (1)

To express it in a less theological phraseology, he declares:

In religious epistemology my fundamental thesis would be that in religious experience at its best there is a revelation (discovery) of a dependable reality, divine in quality and function, which promotes the good will in man on condition of his maintainance of the right adjustment.... (2)

The theory of religious realism presupposes a real universe of things, values and persons, finite and divine; and it interprets life and human experience as essentially a process of adjustment to the real world. The foundation or

(1) D.C. Macintosh; RR, v (preface)

(2) ---- CAT, 306.

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The theory of religious realism presupposes a real

universe of things, values and persons, finite and divine;

and it interprets life and human experience as essentially a

process of adjustment to the real world. The foundation or

spring of such adjustment is found in human nature. This view expresses the faith in the close relationship between humanity and the real universe; the intimate interaction between God and man in the realization of moral and religious values through personal and cosmic experience. It justifies the belief in and the reality of the moral Ideal. God is, in his highest perfection, revealed in the "concrete realities of experience". It asserts that God is the creative "Spirit", the principle of "Interaction", or the highest possibility of value which is accessible to man whenever he turns to him in "right adjustment"; that God reveals himself as the "uplifting spiritual power" in human life, realizing personal values and purposes; and that God is the "providential controller" of the world and the "conservator" of spiritual values. Religious realism, in short, believes in the immanence of objective reality, the "divine Life and Spirit", in human experience; and the presence of that reality in the human soul varies in degree according to the relative attainment of personality or individual adjustment to social and cosmic life. (1)

nature both have a teleological function in relation to the world as a whole. "Man's attempt to progressively come to a knowledge of the nature of the real world in which he finds himself, and of which he is a part", writes A. K. Rogers, "is at the same time a revelation of man himself." That is to say, the very nature and purpose of the world is so constituted as to make it possible for man to find his place and

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CHAPTER I.

EXPERIENCE, REALITY AND EXISTENCE.

To follow the method expressed in the introduction let us now proceed to consider the religious realistic view of the world as a whole, as presented in experience. This leads us to the discovery of four varying interpretations:

1. The teleological integration between man and the universe in the thought of A. K. Rogers.
2. The dualistic character of the universe and its processes--psychical and physical--as implied in the thoughts of W. P. Montague and J. B. Pratt.
3. The conception of the "Five Attributes of Reality" by Boodin.
4. The triadic realism of D. C. Macintosh.

A. The Teleological Integration Between Man and Universe.

Experience according to religious realism involves certain fundamental presuppositions. One of these is the purposive nature ^{of the} world and its cosmic processes. Man and nature both have a teleological function in relation to the world as a whole. "Man's attempt to progressively come to a knowledge of the nature of the real world in which he finds himself, and of which he is a part", writes A. K. Rogers, "is at the same time a revelation of man himself." That is to say, the very nature and purpose of the world is so constituted as to make it possible for man to find his place and

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4. The triadic realism of D. C. MacIntosh.
A. The Teleological Integration between Man and Universe. Experience according to religious realism involves

certain fundamental presuppositions. One of these is the purposive nature of the world and its cosmic processes. Man and nature both have a teleological function in relation to the world as a whole. "Man's attempt to progressively come to a knowledge of the nature of the real world in which he finds himself, and of which he is a part", writes A. K. Rogers, "is at the same time a revelation of man himself." That is to say, the very nature and purpose of the world is so constituted as to make it possible for man to find his place and

and develop his character to the full extent of his natural and organic possibilities. "It is the gradual freeing of himself", he goes on to say, "from a power which is strange and foreign to him, through the recognition that his own life is bound up with this supposed external reality, and that only by accepting it and putting himself in line with the forces that it represents, can he attain a freedom and self-realization that is substantial and real". (1)

In so far, then, as man is truly free he knows the truth; and in so far as he has a real insight into truth he is free. This requires viewing alternately the facts of empirical situations and the world in its metaphysical structure which to a great extent controls the facts of moral life both individual and social.

B. The Duality of the World as Implied in Experience.

A slightly different interpretation from that of A. K. Rogers, but which implies the same purposive nature of the world and the integrative relationship between man and the universe, is presented by W. P. Montague and J. B. Pratt. They recognize the dualistic structure of reality. It is psychical in one aspect, and physical in another aspect.

The most perplexing and perhaps the most central philosophical problem, declares W. P. Montague, is the problem of the nature of consciousness and manner of its relation to the world which it reveals, but in which it also abides. He also recognizes that between the consciousness

(1) A.K. Rogers; SHP, 501.

Students' History of Philosophy. (2nd Ed.) Macmillan, 1915.
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of an object or of a quality, and the neural processes which precede and perhaps accompany that consciousness there is a difference far transcending all differences of quality, magnitude, time, and place with which physics is conversant.

(1) This implies the duality of reality as it is presented in experience or in human consciousness. Indeed, human experience, according J. B. Pratt's critical realistic dualism, recognizes two kinds of existence, the physical and the mental or psychical life. And yet somehow, Pratt wonders, they are brought into more or less close or intimate relationship with each other, either in dualistic parallelism or in process of interaction. (2)

C. The Five Attributes of Reality: Realistic Universe.

The teleological nature of life and existence and the dualistic character of reality raises the problem, "How shall we think of reality as a whole?" Or, how does religious realism explain or interpret the structure of the universe?

J. E. Boodin has written a book entitled A Realistic Universe in which he has attempted to offer a solution to this problem. The book sets forth a realistic interpretation of the world as presented in experience. In the spirit of religio-philosophical contemplation Boodin sees reality as a whole in a mystico-poetical perspective in terms of "The Divine Five-Fold Truth." This means that reality reveals itself in five aspects or under five categories of existence; namely, being, time, space, form, and consciousness. (3)

(1) W.P.Montague; E-WJ, 105.

(2) J.B.Pratt; MS, 7.

(3) J.E.Boodin; RU, 3-11.

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(1) W.P. Montague; E-W, 105.
(2) J.B. Pratt; M, 7.
(3) J.E. Boodin; BU, 3-11.

Let us consider these attributes separately and try to discover what Boodin means by them.

1. Reality as Being: To say that reality is being indicates that the world is not a static sort of reality, but an eternal process, a "constellation of energy, conscious and unconscious, interlocking and interacting in space" governed by specific laws, both natural or mechanical and rational or conscious. The physical universe is in process of infinite stages of "transmutations", and through the dynamic centers or energy, both in the natural and in the personal senses reality hangs together as a whole. "No blind wall separates experience from the world of its interests and love; though thoughts and things are part of the one divine context". (1) Mind, by virtue of its immediacy in experience, is fundamentally the most real of all being and ^{it} ~~which~~ is revealed in the teleological or purposive history of the universe. This is the implication of "Cosmic Evolution". "In a large and profound sense we must conceive mind as part of nature. Mind is not indifferent to nature nor nature to mind". (2) Mind is indeed the fundamental presupposition of the world of being, finite or cosmic being. It is through thoughts that we can use things and things become significant with meanings and values by entering into the context of human and divine thought, or into relationship within one dynamic living minded organism of the cosmos. Thus the universe is a living process, and reality as being is in the making.

(1) Op.cit., 4.

(2) J.E.Boodin; CE, 260-272.

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2. Reality as Time: The activistic and energetic nature of being involves the reality of time through which processes, or the drama of human and cosmic experience, become significant with temporal relations, as past, present and future events. The various changing complexities of the world are held together in the unity of time which gives events their meanings and survival values in the process of evolution. Changes would not become but for the reality of time as the underlying thread that strings and weaves together the streams of organic and personal experiences. The intrinsic values of life would not be realized but for the essence or subsistence of time. "Time is the precondition of the consciousness of before and after, as space is the side-by-side....Upon this consciousness of before and after we build our artificial framework of chronological systems, infinitely outstripping the brief immediate span of a few seconds but none the less deriving their content from it". (1) This is the pragmatic nature of time. Contexts of experience or events come and go, their meanings shift and grow, but time brings these temporal streams of events into the comprehensive unity of the eternal. (2) "The theory of relativity, it is clear, will have to be adapted to the empirical facts. ...Time is of the essence of reality, and no theory of reality can stand which fails to recognize its temporal aspect. And where there is time and change there is relativity". (3)

3. Reality as Space: Space is not a nonexistent

(1) J.E.Boodin; RU, 5-6.
 (2) ----Ibid, Chap.XIV, 251-282.
 (3) ----CE, 323.
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(1) L.E. Bodin: RU, 5-6.
(2) --- Ibid., Chap. XIV, 251-252.
(3) --- CE, 323.

"void". On the contrary, reality as a whole presupposes the existence of space as fundamental. "So long as distance thwarts the will's realization in the hand clasp of loyal men, the meeting of fond lips, and the embrace of loving hearts, space must be recognized as real". (1) Space is real in the sense that it is as time a condition of relation, the relation of things and energies, the stage of interplay or interaction of energies and the field of personal experience. Modern science has accepted space as one of the three attributes or "independent variable", time and energy being the other two. All things float and have their relations in space. Without space there would be no field for the expression of finite and cosmic experiential creativity. "The conception of cosmic space is fundamental in the theory of relativity and in any cosmic philosophy. Space is the universal medium in which the interaction of energies is staged. Without space we can have no metric conceptions such as distance, size and shape. Einstein is right that space is not a nonentity. It has physical reality". (2)

4. Reality as Form: Throughout the complex changing flux of the universe there is an eternal structural form or pattern; and "in the shifting and relative shapes of the flux, the soul comes to the insight, now and then, of eternal beauty". (3) Fitness, order, rightness, beauty, and goodness are the intrinsic forms that human and divine experience seeks to unravel and realize. Real form is the eternal structure

(1) J.E.Boodin; RU, 6-7; 207-250.

(2) ---- CE, 332.

(3) ---- RU, 9-10; 307-384.

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of divine essence. "Beauty is but nature become conscious of its formal character through its more developed organs of human nature---nature and human nature conspire to produce the sunset and the symphony---nature discovers its own order in the rhythmic pulse beats of her complex and restless life---constantly transformed into growing experience of man and universal mind". (1) As reality is in the making, it possesses within itself the pattern, or constitutive ideals in a complete dynamic, not static, wholeness and perfection. This divine form is the direction of life processes and growth, or evolution. Life as it is in the making tends toward life as it ought to be in perfection and supreme value.

5. Reality as Consciousness: If reality is alive only conscious minds can be aware of it; and if life is worth living only personal consciousness can realize its meaning and value. The most important aspect of reality, therefore, is consciousness. "In itself", says Boodin, "consciousness has no variety, no color, no direction. But with it comes to light the color, and variety of this whole checkered flowing world". In other words, "consciousness is a neutral light. It adds only the awareness". (2) This is the pragmatic function of consciousness, that it makes an effective causal difference to the world of experience, and things. The recognition of the reality of consciousness is the wisdom of the Eastern mind in its conception of the reality of the living spirit, the "atma", Buddha or Brahma or the

(1) Op.cit., 10.

(2) Ibid, 8; 115-150.

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Absolute Self in Hindu thought. Nature furnishes the field of conscious expression or awareness; but it is consciousness that realizes their meanings and values in relation to spiritual beings, human and divine. The light of consciousness reveals the glory and splendor of God's world. This in essence is the religious realistic conception of consciousness and reality as a whole. "It reveals itself to our purposive endeavors as a world of restless energies with their relative uniformities---as time, which in the flux of selves and things gives the lie to the past and creates for the soul new mansions of meaning and values---space, the playground of energies---the whole is lighted by consciousness; and running through it all---there must be form---which our finite minds strive to unravel". (1)

D. The Triadic Realism: Three-fold Realms of Reality.

We have seen how Rogers interpreted reality as a teleological process of integration between man and the universe; Montague and Pratt conceived of it in two related aspects, ~~of~~ the physical and the psychical; and then we considered in more detail Boodin's view of reality in terms of the five-fold divine attributes. Let us now turn to a still another form of interpreting the universe by D. C. Macintosh. Macintosh conceives the universe in a triad of realities. (2)

1. The order of physical realism: This is the recognition of the physical universe in space-time relations as existing independently of all finite minds or consciousness

(1) Op.cit., 11.

(2) D.C.Macintosh; RR, 346.

...of conscious experience or awareness; but it is consciousness
...that reveals their meaning and values in relation to
...the divine. The light of consciousness
...reveals the glory and grandeur of God's world. This in
...essence is the religious meaning of consciousness.
...and reality as a whole. "It reveals itself to our pur-
...sue and reveals as a world of reality everywhere with their
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...soul new conditions of meaning and values---a new way-
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B. The Religious Reality: Three-World Reality of Reality.

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...Lewis has given the universe in a triad of realities. (2)
...1. The order of physical reality: This is the re-

...condition of the physical universe in space-time relations
...as external independence of all finite minds or consciousness

(1) Lewis, C. S.
(2) Lewis, C. S., *ibid.*

and in a sense the objective expression of the divine creativity, but none the less distinct from the nature and being of God, and individual persons.

2. The realm of personal realism: This is the assertion of the pluralistic existence of spiritual beings or individual persons, and the affirmation of the realistic view that there are as part of reality individual psychical lives or selves. These psychical beings are the concrete subjects of consciousness and experience.

3. Religious realism: This embraces the faith which is reasonable that there is a religious object which is God who is an existent reality not dependent for his existence upon man's consciousness or ideas; and the metaphysical ground of all reality, in some sense immanent in nature and in personal lives, and in another sense transcendent and objective. God's existence is much more concretely real than the mere ideal or projection of finite minds.

This triadic conception of reality is the result of the attempt of religious realists to create a monistic metaphysical interpretation which is a reconstruction of subjective idealism and objective naturalism. It incorporates Rogers' teleological interpretation, the dualistic interactionism of Montague and Pratt, and also it sets forth in more condensed form the "five-fold divine truth" of Boodin's "realistic universe". Religious realists are in

(1) A.S. Rogers; WT, 789-9. J.B. Pratt; WE, 130, 133, 134-5.

(2) --- 136, 138.

(3) W.F. Montague; WE, 134-5.

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formal agreement with regard to the recognition of three distinct realms of existent realities; namely, things, persons and God.(1)

E. The Realistic Conception of Subsistence: Essence.

There is another aspect of the realm of existence which has in anticipation of the problem of truth a great significance. This is the realistic conception of subsistence or essence. The realm of essence is the realm of meanings and values; but essence implies the realm of subsistence. Only with such presupposition of subsistent existence that certain aspects of experience and events such as error, dreams, illusions and the like could be explained, interpreted and their significance determined. "In its current usage, subsistence has, to begin with, one meaning to ~~to~~ which no exception need be taken. It may refer, that is, to any possible term that stands for a logical aspect or content of human thinking". (2) The laws of reason, relations, ethical principles or virtues and values in their objective conditions do subsist or have their existence apart from any physical or conscious processes. Such things as error and hallucinations, for example, have subsistent existence, but without real existence. (3)

W. P. Montague distinguishes four main divisions of the realm of subsistence as related to experience:

1. Things which have primary intrinsic presence and efficacy in spatio-temporal existence. This is obvious.

2. Things neither existing nor experienced which

(1) A.K.Rogers; WT, 7809. J.B.Pratt; MS, 136,139,184-6.

(2) ----Ibid, 128.

(3) W.P.Montague; WK, 354-5.

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E. The Realistic Conception of Substantive Essence.
There is another aspect of the realm of existence

which has in anticipation of the problem of truth a great significance. This is the realistic conception of substantive or essence. The realm of essence is the realm of meanings and values; but essence implies the realm of substance. Only with such presupposition of substantive existence that certain aspects of experience and events such as error, dreams, illusions and the like could be explained, interpreted and their significance determined. "In its current usage, substance has, to begin with, one meaning to which no exception need be taken. It may refer, that is, to any possible term that stands for a logical aspect or content of human thinking." (2) The laws of reason, relations, ethical principles or virtues and values in their objective conditions do not exist or have their existence apart from any physical or conscious process. Such things as error and hallucinations, for example, have substantive existence, but without real existence. (3)

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(1) A.E. Roberts; WT, 7599; J.B. Pratt; WB, 150, 159, 164-5.
(2) --- Ibid, 128.
(3) W.I. Montague; WB, 354-5.

lack vicarious efficacy. This is absolute negativity or void.

3. Things present in experience but not in existence. Here lies error, dream and illusions.

4. Things existing and enjoying primary time-space efficacy but without vicarious ^{efficiency} efficacy, or representation. Concepts of space, time and values belong in this division.

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A. The Chief Types of Thought Regarding Consciousness.

It has been noted that consciousness is an integral part of the divine truth of reality as a whole; and concerns the most important part of existence. The fact of consciousness seems to have been in the history of thought the greatest stumbling block in the interpretation of human life, at least to traditional naturalism. There are three distinct types of thought that deal with the nature of consciousness:

1. Subjectivism: Subjective idealism declares that reality is constituted entirely in terms of ideas or psychic

(1) Brilliant expositions of these types are to be found in J.E. Pratt, *APH*, Part I; and in W.P. Montague, *WH*, "Postscript"; also in B.B. Macintosh, *PH*.

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CHAPTER II.

EXPERIENCE AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SELF.

We have seen in the previous chapter the religious realistic comprehensive view of reality and existence as presented in experience; and we have noted the varying interpretations. But we have also noted the formal agreement of their slightly differing points of viewing the real world and life as a whole. This agreement lies in their recognition of the three-fold realms of reality, as set forth by D. C. Macintosh, namely; the reality of the physical, the personal and the divine or God. The problem of the present chapter involves the determination of the nature of that ^{the} aspect of reality which is/fundamental ground of experience and personality; that is consciousness. This will involve also the nature and character of the self.

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processes, while the things which science calls physical are mere appearances, the expression or objectification of mind, both finite and absolute.

2. Objectivism: The objectivistic school includes in its fold the naturalistic type of mind; and some of the thinkers in this school, in more recent years, have formed the neo-realistic group. They are sometimes known as behaviorists. Naturalism denies any real existence to what is called consciousness; or it is rather that the term has been misapplied. The term consciousness according to behaviorism, which is the protégé of materialism and neo-realism, is rightly applied to the processes in the physical world taking place within the human brain, and which correspond to the objective behavior of the human organism. And there is no such thing as psychic state. The mind is reduced to mechanical terms.

3. The mediating school: Between these two extreme types of thought regarding consciousness there has emerged a third or synthetic type which serves to mediate reconciliation between them. Critical realism and objective idealism both fall in line with this reconstructive type. Critical realism, however, places a larger emphasis on nature with regard to its reality, while objective idealism tends to minimize the reality of nature; both, nevertheless, agree on the reality and immateriality of consciousness and on the prime importance of the spiritual life. They take issue with either traditional subjective idealism or naturalism; they affirm the denial of

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in its fold the naturalistic type of mind; and some of the thinkers in this school, in more recent years, have formed the neo-realistic group. They are sometimes known as behaviorists. Naturalism denies any real existence to what is called consciousness; or it is rather that the term has been misapplied. The term consciousness according to behaviorism, which is the product of materialism and neo-realism, is rightly applied to the processes in the physical world taking place within the human brain, and which correspond to the objective behavior of the human organism. And there is no such thing as psychic state. The mind is reduced to mechanical terms.

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types of thought regarding consciousness there has emerged a third or synthetic type which strives to mediate reconciliation between them. Critical realism and objective idealism both fall in line with this reconstructive type. Critical realism, however, places a larger emphasis on nature with regard to its reality, while objective idealism tends to minimize the reality of nature; both, nevertheless, agree on the reality and immateriality of consciousness and on the prime importance of the spiritual life. They take issue with either traditional subjective idealism or naturalism; they affirm the denial of

both; that is, the reality of consciousness on the one hand and the reality of nature on the other.

4. Religious realism, it is obvious, accepts the view of critical realism; or it may be said, critical realism takes upon itself a religious outlook. "Man and the universe may be exceedingly unlike;" declares J. B. Pratt, "yet, after all, man is a product of the universe, and, so far as we know the latest and most consummate product, and his nature must therefore be taken into serious consideration by any one who would seek to determine the nature of the world..."(1)

B. Consciousness As A Form of Energy: W. P. Montague.

Consciousness as it has been implied is something different in kind from the physical. Among religious realists it is interpreted as "a form of energy", as immediate "awareness" or condition of meaning and value, as something "superadded" to the mental content of experience, as a "potential" something with purpose, or as "creative activity" in human life.

W. P. Montague thinks of consciousness in terms of his theory of "hylopsychism" or energism. This is the view that consciousness is the potential energy in the realm of mind actualized in thought, as the kinetic energy in the realm of matter actualized in motion; and each type of energy is distinctly different from the other in kind, but they do mutually interact in causal efficiency. This is made explicit in the statement that, "The potentiality of the physical-

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physical is the actuality of the psychical and the potentiality of the psychical is the actuality of the physical". (1) This is consistent with the dualistic interactionism of Pratt, and also compatible with the scientific principle of the conservation of energy; for what is lost of the kinetic energy in organic processes causing mental or psychic potentiality is equated or balanced in the kinetic energy produced or caused by mental activity to the physical organism. This view of consciousness takes full account of the causal relation between the potential and the kinetic energies or between mind and body; this is on the basis that, as Montague believes, secondary qualities of objects or sensations exist in the physical world as the actuality of organic processes in perception. This is in agreement with Boodin's theory that sense quality is a purely physical fact. (2)

The important and promising character of Montague's theory is the recognition of the immateriality of consciousness. It makes possible a spiritual interpretation of the self and personality which is the basic foundation of the ethics of religious realism. In the human species, Montague asserts, there are three levels of potentialities; first, the mechanical process manifesting in space-time changes; second, the vital process manifesting in organic and chemical changes and developing capacities and tendencies for assimilation and adaptation; and third, the sensory process where specific qualities emerge out of organic and neural activities, by

(1) W.P.Montague; BU, 75-82; E-WJ, 103-134; in NR, 282.
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which awareness or self-consciousness becomes a fact. At each indivisible instant of its existence the self possesses a retrospect of the past, a prospect of the future and a perspective view of external presence. This is the tri-dimensional aspect of consciousness. (1)

C. Consciousness as a Universal Condition: J.E.Boodin.

The energistic conception of the nature of consciousness has just been considered which took the form of the theory of hylopsychism in Montague's thought. Boodin explicitly denies that consciousness can be explained in terms of energetic processes; neither can consciousness be derived from energy, nor from any potentiality. He believes that it is an underlying actuality in the nature of reality, while "some energetic situations are potentially conscious only when consciousness is added to them". Viewed from the empirical situations, it is neither the rational aspect of mental processes nor the cognitive meaning of perceptions. It is the "condition for intuiting" or "lighting up" such meaning with its inherent relationship; an awareness of relations in the conative system. Consciousness, in other words, is simply an added fact which is somehow bound up with the subjective significance of relations, or that which makes an energetic situation aware of itself. (2)

This view makes consciousness transcendental and abstract, and sharply distinguished from mind and its mental processes. Boodin thinks that conative processes and also

(1) W.P.Montague; in NR, 282-4.

(2) J.E.Boodin; RU, 119-123; CE, 386-401.

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tendencies do exist and operate apart and without consciousness; but these derive their significance and values only when the fact of consciousness is added to them. Consciousness, therefore, is some kind of precondition for the awareness of meanings and the realization of values. (1) The function of the psychophysical organism must therefore be dependent for its character and individual status on the underlying cosmic consciousness of reality. This is the Divine Consciousness; and each individual self is a divine spark of the life of God. It is this, obviously in the mind of Boodin, that gives the moral and spiritual character of man and his experience. Personality becomes the vessel or the bearer of intrinsic meanings and values of life only when it acquires or is endowed with consciousness, that is when the energy of the personal will becomes conscious.

Consciousness, then, is a universal fact; as such it is in the nature and being of God. It stands in an analogous condition to the reality of time and space. It is there in the cosmic environment as a public property, but "split off in our own personal history". It is a common reservoir or spring of moral character and value. It makes a pragmatic difference to the life of every individual. It is the reward, so to speak, or concomitant result of certain successfully organized types of mental and organic adjustment and perfection.

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D. Consciousness and the Self. *The Absolute Self.*

We have seen that the religious realistic view of consciousness is an adaptation from critical realism which is akin to empirical objective idealism and is at issue with traditional subjectivism. We also noted two points of view or differentiation in interpreting the nature of consciousness, namely; the energism of Montague and the universalism of Boodin. Combining the two views,⁸ we have as a result a dialectic religious realism with regard to the nature of consciousness and the self. This is the "activistic" view expressed in D. C. Macintosh's explanation of the nature of mind which will be considered in connection with the epistemology of religious realism and the creativity of mind in the next chapter.

Let us now at this point turn to the consideration of the making of the self or personality, and the religious realistic conception regarding it. While subjective idealism conceived of the self as the "soul" in the neo-platonic transcendental sense, critical realism on the other hand conceives of it in terms of the empirical self; and while objective idealists, such as Royce, have failed to clearly distinguish the individual finite self from the "absolute", critical religious realists have succeeded in making this distinction emphatic. The more empirical type of objective idealism, however, as exemplified in the exponents of "personal idealism"⁽¹⁾ has consistently emphasized this distinction

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between the finite individual and the Absolute Self.

The self, then, from the metaphysical point of view according to religious realists is a "split off in our own personal history". That is to say, the self is a unified "stream of consciousness", as William James had put it, in the life of an individual human being. Self-consciousness emerges or, as Boodin would say, is "added to a situation" whenever an organism attains a sufficiently high degree of complex integration and organization.

This complex integration and organization is manifest in man as a psychophysical organism capable of purposive action and rational adjustments both to internal and external conditions. Man by virtue of his natural heritage, declares Hugh Hartshorne, is equipped with organic structures which, when subjected to the proper stimuli in the physical and social environment, develop into a unique sense of selfhood or awareness of self identity.(1) Man becomes aware or conscious of his own factual existence in the social environment and in the cosmic universe. Thus the potentiality of Montague's concept of energetic consciousness becomes actualized or realized into a concrete individual self. The potential and transcendental or objective consciousness of Boodin becomes in the self immanent and differentiated into unique individual character or being---and we call this man. The self, obviously, is an individualized or differentiated concrete center of conscious relation or spiritual energy.

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From the empirical side of individuality, the self is what we must take it as "being in conduct". The psychophysical organism is a "bundle of tendencies, leadings, purposive strivings---an organization which comes to consciousness through conflict", and the self emerges as the character or unity of the streams or flow of experiences, guided from within by the energy of the purposive will, interests, desires and feelings; and stimulated or "set off" by external conditions or relations. The significance of this empirical unity and what is involved in the being of the self is well expressed by A. K. Rogers, saying:

As an experienced fact it is a unity of a fairly definite and verifiable sort, characterized by such things as present felt unity of a conscious field, a sense of intimate connection with certain portions of the past, and in particular, a range of purposes or ends which anticipate in a definable way the future....There lie potentialities (abstract consciousness) in the background which are not fully realized completely; and these to all appearance supply the source from which in some sense the realized facts of experience in particular spring. (1)

This implies that the self is more than what is obviously presented in conduct, and this seems to me plausible. For if the subconscious or the unconscious processes in man mean anything they must have a bearing and significance for the making of the character of personality, however abstract, unempirical or unethical these may be.

Where the self or personality differs radically from the mere psychophysical organism is the fact that consciousness with its laws of reason, meanings and values is

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"superadded" to the organic and mental functionings which make for the unity and identity of the self-consciousness in a concentric whole. Personality, then, becomes a comprehensive unity of the variegated diversity of experiences or conduct. A person, it would follow, is a center of emotion, reason and volition or will. The significance of the self and its place in reality is fairly well characterized by J. B. Pratt who says that "man with his spiritual nature is a fact, the fundamental and central fact from which our whole interpretation of the universe may well start." He says further:

And if we start with man as he is, we shall be led to recognize that Reality stretches out beyond the realm of merely natural, that it contains a sphere which may well be called the Realm of the Spirit....We know that there is a spiritual realm, because we find that man cannot be adequately understood or described without recognizing the independent reality of the spirit. We know that there is a supernatural realm because we find that we ourselves are in part members of it. (1)

This may well be the core of the insight of religious realism, for if there is ever a key to Reality or the clue to the real existence of the divine Ideal, it is in and through the full apprehension of the nature and character of moral and spiritual self or personality.

Another empirical view of the self is presented by W. K. Wright, in terms of ethical and social relations. He speaks of the self as the establishment of organized habits or "sentiments"; and "we may say that a man's sentiments (that

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A very plausible and broader view of the self, it seems to me, is presented by Pratt. In the making of the personality, he not only includes everything that is revealed

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or implied by the "empirical me" of Wright and all that is involved in a present consciousness, but also embraces those unconscious and subconscious elements that can contribute to the character of the individual. His characterization of the self is plainly stated thus:

Each self is of course characterized by its present conscious state, but its present consciousness forms only a small portion of its nature. Much more important in making it what it is are its memories, tendencies, sentiments, its purposes and ideals. These do not exist in the form of present consciousness. To make room, then, for the most significant portion of the personality or character we must have recourse to unconscious mental organization. If there be a self at all, character is surely a part of it, and character is much more than consciousness. Any given passing conscious state is thus merely an aspect or activity of the self. The self may be called a center of psychic powers, whose characteristics necessarily transcend any given section of conscious content or phase of conscious experience, and which are essentially inexhaustible by any passing moment. (1)

In other words, the self is the sum total of organic tendencies, capacities for psychical activities, and their interactions. These include the sensory processes of the brain differentiating into qualitative significance; ideation into complex meanings and values; feelings or emotional responses to meanings and values; and the rational control and guidance of the reaction mechanism of the body and the nervous system in accordance with ideals or the volitional choices of the active will. "The self, then, is a genuine reality ~~with~~ with a unity and identity of its own, a center of influence and energy and not to be confounded with a mere sum of qualities or states". (2)

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E. Recapitulation.

To sum up the religious realistic interpretation of the nature of consciousness, we may say that, as an integral part of this dynamic Reality as a whole, consciousness is recognized as a form of spiritual energy and a universal condition of life, meanings and personal values. Further, it is thought of as differentiated into diverse personalities or individual selves, both finite and divine. Personality, on the other hand, as a differentiated individual self-consciousness, is interpreted as the realization or emergence of a spiritual being out of an internal, social and cosmic adjustment of a psychophysical organism endowed with natural capacities and spiritual potentialities for active, purposive and rational development.

The problem of this chapter is to determine what moral experience is in the light of the religious realistic theory of knowledge and truth. This will involve the following considerations: first, truth and common sense realism; second, knowledge and the creativity of mind; third, truth and the structure of the mind or the morphology of truth;

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CHAPTER III.

MORAL EXPERIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.

We have seen in the previous chapter an interpretation of experience in general in the light of the religious realistic view of the nature of consciousness and the self. In this connection, it was pointed out that it is based on the theory of critical realism which is a dialectic synthesis of subjective idealism and objective realism. It recognizes the objective reality of consciousness in general as was shown in the first chapter. It also recognizes the immanence of consciousness in individual personal experience of selves. Furthermore, a distinction was also made between two types of religious realistic explanation; first, the energism of Montague and second, the universalism of Boodin. It was still further suggested that these two types do merge into the activistic view of consciousness. In connection with the nature of the self, the empirical, social and broader aspects of the making of personality were comprehensively noted and considered.

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fourth, pragmatic realism or the relativity and practical value of truth; fifth, scientific realism as applied to religious knowledge and beliefs; and lastly, truth and its relation to volition and character. The most important concern of consciousness, to my mind, lies in two directions, namely, the search for knowledge and truth, and the realization of value and character. Both knowledge and value have a large and supremely important place in the making of moral experience. To restate the aim of this chapter let me quote the simple title of a book, What is Truth? by A. K. Rogers. The bearing of truth in moral experience lies obviously in the fact that honest thinking makes for honest living. Truth is the ideal of thought as character is the ideal of conduct. Both thought and conduct have an underlying motive, that is, a desire for the attainment of intrinsic personal satisfaction, for rational completeness on the one hand and for emotional richness and abundance of spiritual life on the other.

A. Truth and Common Sense Realism.

To common sense realism, upon which critical and religious realism is grounded, truth is what we know to be true. Common sense, however, begs further reconstruction and definition. One thing is certain in common sense, nevertheless, and that is, that truth rests on the knowledge of the object, material or conceptual, which is regarded to be true. "Truth for me", declares a critical dualist, "is what I cannot help believing"⁽¹⁾ Here, again, the act of believing presupposes

(1) A.K. Rogers; WT, 1.

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(1) A. K. Rogers; WT, I.

knowledge, or at least a partial understanding of what is taken to be true; and upon such an understanding a certain emotionalized act of faith is built up or founded. This knowledge process is attained by the use of concepts. Wieman in one of his books says that "Truth is a verifiable belief.... A belief is verified by testing it experimentally and observing the consequences".(1) This experimental and pragmatic procedure in the determination of the truth of any belief or knowledge is accomplished, according to Wieman, by the use of concepts. These concepts are "intellectual devices which enable us to do a number of things". They are the processes of differentiation into distinctive meanings or individualization; representation or mediation of remote objects or ideas; and inference from given data of experience.(2) Without concepts, he claims, there would be no truth, although without them there is existential reality of which concepts are symbols.

B. Knowledge and the Creativity of Mind.

Knowledge, then, is an intellectual or conscious process; and hence it presupposes an active self or at least a mind that thinks and understands. In personal interaction with the surrounding environment, Wieman thinks, there are three important factors involved: First, the impact of the world upon the human organism. Second, the sensitivity and responsiveness of the organism to this impact of the world and the environment. Third, the fact of conscious awareness

(1) H.N. Wieman; WRT, 213-253. Quotation, 218.

(2) Ibid, 215-218.

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as inherently a part of the psychophysical behavior and response.(1) These factors involve, therefore, the consideration of the structure of the mind and the nature of its processes. Critical realism places a great importance upon this phase of the creative activity of the mind.

The epistemological problem of religious realism is based primarily on the mutual interaction between the world and the mind. The critical reconstructive attitude of Montague in his The Ways of Knowing, and of Macintosh in his The Problem of Knowledge tend toward epistemological monism; while the conciliatory attitude of Pratt in his Adventures in Philosophy and Religion and Rogers in his What Is Truth? tend toward dualism. Both of these tendencies, however, expressly recognize the duality of thought and its object, and that mind and thing exist independently of their own right.

While religious realism recognizes the independent reality of both mind and its object, it nevertheless asserts that they mutually interact in the knowledge experience, that is, in actual perceptive process. Knowledge arises out of the creative or active nature of mind which deals directly with the external world; while the self-consciousness weaves together in a concentric whole the meaning and values of the stream of variegated experiences.

The historical development or movement toward an activistic view of the nature of mind and consciousness is recognized by Macintosh as very significant.(2) This activistic theory of mind is based upon the empirical fact of the

(1) Op.cit., 215.

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(1) O.C. cit., p. 215.
(2) D.C. MacIntosh; p. 214.

causal efficacy of psychical processes. "Causality is productive activity....The cause is something which does something else." This is the simple way by which Macintosh states the principle of causality.(1) Rogers defines causation as not simply a passive and ineffective relation between antecedent and consequent events, but more significantly as an "effective causality, in terms of conscious motive" which makes a pragmatic difference to the physical world.(2) Montague declares that "All true causality involves a transfer of influence or energy from the causal agent (mind) to the patient (object) on which the effect is produced".(3) From these assertions it may be gathered that religious realism believes that all the psychical activities, sensations, perceptions, memories, images, conceptions, judgments, reason, feeling and will are bound up together in the creative activity of the mind or self.

In reply to the naturalistic neo-realists who charge that this activistic view of mind and its power of interaction with the outside world is a "confounded mystery", religious realists would say that "no philosopher will ever succeed in driving mystery out of the processes of life and consciousness or from any other phase of real existence". Macintosh asserts emphatically that "This mystery of creative psychical activity is simply a special instance of the universal mystery of being and especially of becoming".(4) Boodin, on the other hand, offers his rebuttal against the charge declaring that;

(1)Op.cit., 316.

(2)A.K.Rogers; WT, 142, 187.

(3)W.P.Montague; E-WJ, 119.

(4)D.C.Macintosh; PK, 314.

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- (2) A. K. Rogers; W. J. 187.
- (3) W. P. Montague; E. W. 119.
- (4) D. C. MacIntosh; P. K. 314.

We know mind for certain, at least in connection with physiological processes---we know it nevertheless as pure---better than we know anything else---we know mind as it is---with its definite internal relations....Mind is distinct from consciousness. Consciousness is not mental---but mental entities are acts of consciousness. Mental processes exist without consciousness....Consciousness added to them bring forth significance....There is nothing mysterious about the structure of the mind and its functioning as modern psychology would lead one to believe....But the fact is that we know vastly more about the mental functioning than we do about cerebral functioning.(1)

C. Truth and the Structure of Mind: Morphology of Truth.

J. E. Boodin in his Truth and Reality has undertaken an extensive analysis of the mechanism of mind and the knowing process, and an examination of what constitutes truth in its relation to the subjective world of the individual as well as social experience and also to the objective world of reality. His thesis, briefly stated, is that truth is whatever corresponds to reality as presented in experience, or the "experience of identity" between an idea and the corresponding object, material or immaterial object of perception.

Let us now at this point consider the subjective factors in the knowledge process or experience as set forth by critical realists and interpreted by Boodin. The experience of truth is founded on the realistic conception of "Mind as Instinct" in its structure.(2) To state briefly, Boodin holds that the mind is a structure potent with instinctive tendencies for reaction and growth in response to external

(1)Excerpts from J.E.Boodin; CE, 220; RU, 152, 165.

(2)J.E.Boodin; TR, Chapt. II, 15-43.

stimuli, both physical and social environment. To be sure the mental equipment of man is radically different and higher from that of the lower animal. The human brain and its nervous system is much more highly complex and sensitive. This view is corroborated in the author's other work, Cosmic Evolution in what he calls "minded organism". He says:

Mind is not to be conceived as a stream of events, but as energy structure, capable of selective interaction and exchange with other energy structures. It is a unique energy field, existing in specific relations to other energy fields, such as the instrumental bodily field, and the enveloping physical and mental field....The minded organism no longer functions as a mere reflex mechanism. It is capable of responding by means of memory, judgment, and reflective thought. It can appreciate beauty, ascertain truth and recognize right. ...It is essentially a social pattern. (1)

There are three stages in the development of the mental tendencies in relation to internal and external stimuli. These stages are as follow: (2)

1. The sensitive stage: This concerns with primary instincts, which are "slots" as it were in a mechanism with definite types of responses. These are aroused or "set off" by certain definite stimuli. They are mechanical, autonomic and motor coordinations. Out of these primary instinctive responses emerges primitive consciousness or the vague sense of awareness with regard to self and the external world. Some confused sense of values, feelings and meanings also emerge. They are part of the functioning or the dawning of conscious intelligence and emotional impulses. They are made definite by the method of trial and error development which involves

(1) J.E. Boodin; CE, 210-232; especially 212-217.

(2) ---- TR, 19-20.

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interests, habits and sentiments.

2. The associative-memory stage: In this stage there are developed secondary instincts or impulses which are differentiations of mental structure according to social patterns of responses. The sense of reason and social consciousness begin to be established; ~~and so~~ ^{they} create new possibilities of more highly complex reactions or adjustment to environment.

3. The reflective or rational stage: A further and infinitely more complex structural variation of differentiations appears in this stage. There is the development of the power of analysis, abstraction, conception, meaning, and valuation. This is "the most wonderful leap" in the human evolutionary process. There appears also a new group of tendencies or the demand for simplicity and consistency, for unity and wholeness, for beauty, right, happiness and the demand for truth, both scientific and religious truths. Herein evolves the conscious search for reality and for the moral and religious ideal.

The mind, then, has three significant stages of development; the sensitive or individual, the associative or social, and the reflective or normative stages. There is no sharp line of distinction, however, among these stages; and their development depends upon the degree of self organization and the condition or character of the environment. The goal or end for which the evolution of mental development is directed is toward the attainment of the highest degree of

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consistent knowledge or truth and value in the realization of moral character. In other words, the mind by its nature and purpose seeks the most complete revelation of truth and highest good in reality. The search for knowledge and truth is an important factor in moral experience. Furthermore, the emergence of intelligence and the power of reason gives rise to certain levels of thinking. These are:

1. The level of perception: In this level the mind projects outward into the objective world, the external stimuli by which the mind develops the power of coordination, relating things and events in space and time. Here also lies the development of the power of social imitation.

2. The level of empirical generalization: This is the level of mental economy by means of which, through processes of deduction and induction, the mind frees itself from the bondage or dependence on external facts. The logical mind abstracts from given data of experience or concrete empirical situations, a synthesis or principle involving uniformity, identity, quality, quantity, causality and interpretation of internal and external relations or meanings. (1)

3. The level of idealization: At this level, the mind not only abstracts from experience or generalizes certain facts, but also creates a higher supersynthesis. That is to say, the mind considers not ^{what} what experiences are but, experience ought to be in the light of a rational ideal involving first, the unity of the whole of life; second, harmonious

(1) Op.cit., 44-63.

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consistency or coherence of the parts with the whole, and third, the clear cut simplicity of the total relationship and harmonious interaction within the whole of life.

D. Pragmatic Realism: Practical and Relative Truth.

We may say, then, from the foregoing analysis of the mind, that complete knowledge is the ideal of the intellectual life. Inner consistency of the mind and its ideas is one of the two principal factors of the truth experience. The other factor is objective consistency and value. Knowledge is true or valid, relatively in so far as it approximates the ideal truth and consistent with the objective real world. Subjectively, truth or valid judgment requires that the mind attains a coherent unity which generates a dynamic and creative personality. Any judgment or belief has the greatest possibility of being true when it is consistent with the inner life as a whole, free from self-contradiction, and conducive to the moral worth and growth of the individual personality. Belief is an act of faith founded on the degree of reasonableness with the inner life. This is recognized by critical religious realists

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It is apparent, then, that mere subjective consistency is not a complete criterion of truth, according to critical realism.(1) A judgment must find an objective ground in reality to which the subjective processes should agree or correspond. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between truth and error, fact and illusion. The truth experience must manifest in an "experience of identity" or "correspondence" between the inner and the outer world, the identity or correspondence of the object of perception and the real object that is perceived.

For pragmatism, asserts Boodin, mind is no longer a merely complex mechanism of ideas, nor can the significance of thought be expressed in the formal or subjective relations of intellectualistic logic. Mental activities must be expressed in terms of needs, interests and satisfactions. These practical satisfactions are realized in the "adaptive congruities between a conative structure and a specific environment". Obviously, there must be a correspondence at least between a subjective idea and the objective reality.(2) A true and

(1) A.K. Rogers; WT, 11-12.

(2) E.E. Boodin; ~~TRXXESIXX~~.CE, 222-3.

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valid judgment must, in other words, have a reference to physical, social and cosmic reality and value "existing beyond the apperceptive unity of momentary individual consciousness" Reality and value are dependent upon the cognitive moment not for their existence but for their meaning in personal experience.(1) The object of thought must, then, enter into relation with mental processes and personal consciousness, for "thought is so wedded to things that things cannot exist without being thought."

What has been said about the intimate relation between the mind and its object or thought and thing implies that the external objects, things, persons, relations or ideals, do have objective existence and reality apart from the perceiving mind; but it implies also that their meanings and values cannot be determined apart from their being perceived by conscious minds. They are known in conscious experience. And the validity or truth of the perceptual judgment is discovered in their fitness, identity or correspondence with the real objective existence to which they refer. Hence, pragmatic realism, according to religious realism is the affirmation of the thesis that the truth of every idea, judgment or knowledge must be determined by the most complete ^{and} satisfactory inner consistency and objective practicality or harmony with the facts of the external world. Critical monism and dualism both find on this basis their common ground in their epistemology. Macintosh states :

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This seems to me a fairly clear statement of the critical realistic view, and it offers the possibility of ^{the} knowledge of God through the immediate knowledge of natural, social and cosmic environment.

Critical religious realism, therefore, is in its epistemology synthetic and reconstructive in its essential character. There are three essential phases in arriving at truth. First: That what is true is simply the real considered as the object of a possible conscious belief or judgment. When the object is real, the judgment in regard to it must be real. This is modified pan-objectivism. Second: That what is true is whatever would be confirmed by an all-comprehending mind or absolute experience. Truth is conformability to further experience. This is reconstructed pan-subjectivism. Third: That what is true is whatever in the individual corresponds to what exists outside the individual. This is the identity of the "intra-individual" (idea) with the

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"extra-individual" (object). This is synthetic dualism or critical monism. (1)

E. Scientific Realism Applied to Religious Knowledge.

Thus we see the obvious emphasis of religious realists on the objectivity of knowledge and truth. It is on this incentive for the objectivity of truth that science has come to an important place in religious realism. "Scientific method", declares Macintosh, "is or claims to be, the universally valid way of proving the truth of true judgments about reality and of discrediting the claims of judgment which are not true. This presupposes the notion of truth, which, as everyone who has not been tampered with knows, is some sort of agreement or correspondence or identity between the idea and the reality or subject-matter about which it is predicated, judged to be true".(2) In fact the scientific spirit in religion is emphatically stressed by H. N. Wieman in his book, Religious Experience and Scientific Method, and by D. C. Macintosh in his Theology As An Empirical Science.

"Experimental realism in religion" seeks to interpret religious faith, ideals and beliefs in terms of verifiable objective experience and their values. Religion must be subjected to the rigor and vigor of analysis and evidence. Our ideas about God must find their practical validity and truth by means of their relations with the divine objective Reality as presented in experience. Macintosh fairly and clearly states the main issue:

(1) Compare W.P.Montague; WK, 319-413 or 311-2; A.K.Rogers, WT, 68; J.B.Pratt, APR, 136-9; MS, 184-5; J.E.Boodin, TR, 251.
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(1) Compare W. B. Montague; WK, 319-315 or 311-2; A. K. Rogers,
WT, 66; J. B. Pratt, APR, 136-9; MS, 184-2; J. E. Bodin, TR, 251.
(2) D. G. Macintosh; RR, 322.

We have been led to make a distinction between judgments which we have a moral right to believe to be true and judgments which we know to be true, and the difference is made by the fact that in the latter instance we have been able to employ the scientific method of verification.... What we can experience we can know. If there is an independently existing physical world and if we can have genuine first-hand experience of it, so that what it is as reality is at least partly presented within the field of our direct observation, we can know it, at least in part. The same statement may be made about the human self, and about the religious object, God....If there is an independently existing religious object, or God, as religious realism maintains, and if we can have any direct experience of this divine reality, we can have some genuinely verified, or scientific, religious knowledge. (1)

When we speak of verified beliefs, says Wieman in The Issues of Life, we mean beliefs that are supported by sufficient evidence to justify us in accepting them and living by means of them.(2) This evidence is attained by the scientific approach which has a four-fold function. The four functions are: First, the formation of an idea as to what course of action will produce specific consequences by observing various possible consequences that have issued forth from various specific conditions. Second, the determination as accurately as possible of just what the conditions are under which this course of action can best be profitably followed to produce the desired and anticipated consequences. Third, the creation of such conditions for the performance of the course of action taken and the observation of what happens. Fourth, the development by logical inference of what to expect in the light of what has been observed to happen, ~~and~~

(1)Dp.cit., 332-3.

(2)H.N.Wieman; IL, 179-192.

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and then finally testing these inferences in the same manner as the original idea was tested through the previous processes. Experience, then, does not yield knowledge or truth unless it is subjected to the right scientific method. But, on the other hand, there is no knowledge without experience.(1)

Over against this issue religious realism finds an adequate justification in Christianity. "Jesus remains for us", declares Boodin, "the choicest incarnation of cosmic genius in the warm flesh of mother earth....It means the creative incarnation of divinity, not merely in individual, but in society....It makes for creative wholeness of life, as broad as humanity, yea as expansive as the cosmos....God is too vast for our limited imagination, too rich for our abstract thought. His is the creative genius of the ages---the genius of infinite cosmos".(2) The reality of God is, to the religious realist, revealed to us in our experience, in the experience of the race and in the personality of Jesus which is the most concrete and complete revelation of God's nature and reality.

F. Truth and Its Relation to Volition and Character.

Let us recapitulate the essential points involved in the religious realistic theory of knowledge and its relation to moral experience. We noted at the outset that what common sense would call truth or belief does, as a matter of fact, imply deeper considerations than what seem to appear on the surface of common ordinary thinking. Knowledge has been

(1)Op.cit., 190-192.

(2)J.E.Boodin; CE, 470-1.

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(1) Cf. pp. 190-192.
(2) J. E. Boodin; Cf. p. 470-1.

shown to involve the creativity of the mind endowed with a mechanism for instinctive and integrative reactions and interactions with the external world, and with the capacity for growth and development out of which emerges the intellectual life or the rational self. We have noted also that in the search for truth the conscious mind not only seeks consistency, unity, and harmony within its subjective processes, but also projects outward into the objectively real world for satisfactory verifications and practical values in life; and truth is attained relative to the degree of success in this objective process. This objective process was also shown to manifest in the pragmatic or scientific method which, when applied to the realm of religion, offers grounds for the validity and relative certainty of religious truths.

The problem of truth for religious realism, therefore, must take account of scientific procedure and recognize the laws of thought, reason and beliefs. Furthermore, the thinking processes must be looked upon as a form of volitional conduct involving intellectual interests and satisfactions for the practical needs of the moral life; it is an adjustive process in the sense that the mind seeks to choose, select or discriminate between the rightness and wrongness of ideas, beliefs and judgments.(1) Truth is to thought as value is to desire. In either case the human free will underlies the process of its realization. Thought is the systematic activity of the will; the will sets off to thinking and

(1)J.E.Boodin; TR, 67-85; 126-7.

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postulates certain laws and norms. The relative success in the discovery of truth is in itself an intrinsic value which contributes to the moral character of the individual. Truth is the "regulator of conduct", a principle of individual moral control. Merely to think of a concept, says Wieman, does not make it either true or false. It is only when some claim is made for that concept that it becomes constitutive of truth or error. And the claim must always be something of practical value as the result of experimental operation with the concept put into the form of a hypothesis or belief.(1) In other words, truth, moral and religious truths must find their place in actual experience for their meaning and value, both to the individual and ^{to the} social order.

4. The Nature and Meaning of Value: Realistic View.

Another way of expressing the same idea stated at the beginning of the previous chapter is that concerning individual experience there are two important aspects involved: First, the formal demand of the intellectual side of life,

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CHAPTER IV.

MORAL VALUE AND THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTER.

Hitherto we have considered experience in terms of religious realistic metaphysics and epistemology, and we are now about to consider it in terms of moral value. In the first chapter we noted the religious realistic dynamic view of the universe, and found that psychic or conscious experience is an integral part of reality. In the second chapter we examined comprehensively the nature of consciousness and how it is differentiated into individual selves through personal experience or the inner integration and social adaptation of ^{the} psychophysical organism. And in the third chapter we reflected upon the bearing of knowledge and truth, as critical religious realists conceived them, in moral experience. In this regard we noted that consistent knowledge and coherent truth must find, in experience, identity or correspondence with objective reality. This objectivity of truth determines the practical value of the knowledge experience, which is especially significant in the realms of moral and religious experience, to the moral growth of personality.

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A. The Nature and Meaning of Value: Realistic View.

Another way of expressing the same idea stated at the beginning of the previous chapter is that concerning individual experience there are two important aspects involved: First, the formal demand or the intellectual side of life,

reason, knowledge and truth. Second, the demand of the emotional or volitional side of life or conduct, the demand of will, feelings, desires and the call for satisfactions, the fulfillment of instinctive impulses and conscious purposes. This may be said to be the valuational aspect of moral experience. Knowledge of itself, however, is also a value, a means to truth which is intrinsically an intellectual value in personal life. The experience of truth answers the demand for mental satisfaction. In this chapter we are concerned with moral values that contribute to the character of the individual; that is to say, the realization of man's spiritual nature, a being endowed with the will and organic mechanism as means to the fulfillment of the objectives of life. Personal intrinsic values are determined by the way in which the inner structure and constitution of man are organized and controlled in volitional conduct. This, in brief, is the realistic interpretation of value experience.

Wieman's realism conceives of value as in a sense a meaningful experience; that is, not that all experiences and events have meanings, but that there are "meaningless experiences". It is only when value is attached to these experiences that they have meaning. "Meaning is the mental instrument", defines Wieman, "by which we control experience and magnify its value." Life mounts in value, he continues to say, and security just in so far as we bring into operation the right meanings and use them rightly. "The whole problem

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of human life, in a nutshell, is just this: How to magnify the values and security of life". (1) This in substance is the principle of the revaluation of values through creative reconstruction of the meaning of personal experience. And this is the common function of morality and religion. In other words, we may say that "The deepest drive of human life is to render itself more abundant. To become more abundant means to have access to wider ranges of experience for use and enjoyment. The one supreme and indispensable means to this increase of life is meaning". (2) The meaning experience as applied to religion, it seems to me, is simply the mystical experience in prayer, communion and worship. Worship at its best, according to Wieman, is precisely this: "It is the great regenerator, renewer, and reconstructor of human life because it fosters that experience which provides for the extreme reconstruction of meanings". (3)

Realistically, then, the values of life are apprehended through some sort of immediate experience, intuitive knowledge, or mystical awareness of meanings or human and divine purposes. The fulness of conscious experience is illumined by its meaning and value to life. These meanings and values are realized in personal integration of the individual with the total environment.

B. The Objectivity of Value and the Moral Judgment.

The mere possibility of intuitive knowledge or mystical awareness of meanings and values seem to imply the

(1) H.N. Wieman; RESM, 324-5.

(2) Ibid, 330, 339.

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The realm of values is independent of any and all natural processes and has its own a priori validity....Values are given a priori, but they are given as bearers of content, (or meaning) not empty nor dependent upon the validity of a merely formal principle of duty....Values must be experienced in and for themselves (that is intrinsic values). They are not constructions of a synthetic activity of understanding, nor deducible on the basis of purely rational principle.(1)

This seems to imply that in the constitution of the real universe there are certain relations or meanings which when brought into an empirical situation with conscious minds do emerge; that is to say, the individual becomes aware of their presence and significance in experience. Boodin says that "the unique contribution which is made by the experience relation is the world of values". And then he further asserts that "values have their basis in the relation of objects, with their qualities, to the realization of the will".(2)

Values, then, are objective in the sense that they subsist or inhere in reality as a whole; but like knowledge they must be realized in personal or conscious experience. They become empirically real to the individual who experiences them; they exist potentially in the formal aspect of the realistic universe. This ^{is} affirmed by Boodin in his statement that:

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objective world....They are unique characteristics within certain relations, implying a specific type of organization. They are just as much a part of the real world under their own conditions as are the unique properties of water within their own special system....The values of things are derived from their being taken up into the process of conscious realization.(1)

An important point in this realistic thought is that values are not created, for in essence they already exist; but that consciousness discovers them in experience. The values for which human beings strive to attain are there in the real world by divine creation or gift, and it is for man to realize them in volitional activity. It is on this basis that the objectivity of the moral judgment in realistic ethics is founded. Just as ideas must find their truth and validity in the objective world so ethical principles or moral judgments must also find their objective value in the realm of the objectively real values.

C. The Good As Empirical Value in Moral Experience.

Values, then, from the empirical point of view may be said to be the creative realization of personal experience. They are the meanings or quality of experience or conduct. In order to have value there must be the fulfillment of organized tendencies of the self or interests in terms of its objects. An object has value whenever it satisfies a certain complex organization of impulses or instinctive tendencies.(2) In other words, a value is that which is desired, or the object of inner nature. It is the significance of conscious

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In other words, a value is that which is desired, or the object of inner nature. It is the significance of conscious

experience with reference to the realization of the object of personal will and interest. "An object has value," declares Montague, "to the extent that it can fulfill a potentiality". Potentiality is used here in the sense that man is born with organic or instinctive mechanism capable of psychic manifestations and value experience.(1)

In terms of motives and the fulfillment of interest, Wieman characterizes value or the good as follows:

The good is any fulfillment of interest. Interest is any motor-affective attitude....Interest may be more or less inclusive. Love at its best is the most complete integration of the greatest number and diversity of interests of the individual and of associated individuals. The supreme good is fulfillment of the most inclusive interest, or, if one prefers the phrase, of the most inclusive system of interest....Value is inherent in the totality of all being because that totality is inherently related to human living....Value is objective; it is "out there" just as much as anything else is out there although it can not be unrelated to human living any more than the rest of the universe can be unrelated to human living....Interest constitutes value; but human interest is always much more than human....It (value) is a character pertaining to the ultimate cause.(2)

This statement has a four-fold implication: First, the universality of value or goodness. Second, the inherent or potential capacity of the universe of values to respond to human interest in fulfillment of human needs and aspirations. Third, the necessity of creative interaction between the universe and the individual, or man's adjustive behavior with his environment in order to realize his values. And fourth, evil and suffering enter into experience either as the frustration of interest or the sacrificing of lesser interest for the greater

(1)W.P.Montague; BU, 29.

(2)H.N.Wieman; WRT, 160-165.

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and more inclusive interest, in which case suffering becomes a "transmuted evil". Individual moral growth or the development of personality depends upon the relatively increasing capacity to progressively reorganize into more and more inclusive system all its interests in its interaction with its immediate environment and with the "order of the greatest possible value" or God.

D. Classification of Values.

Let us now at this point consider the realistic classification of these realizable values. The objective character of values makes possible, according to moral realism, the classification of them though only in an arbitrary manner. Wright, in his chapter on "Eudaemonism" to which system of ethics he is committed, classifies values into two general groups, instrumental and intrinsic. "Values are intuitively recognized by men when they emerge upon a sufficiently high level of development; but the means by which those values can be attained successfully can only be learned through observation and experience, and the calculation of consequences".

(1) The recognition of virtues, however, has been a gradual process in moral evolution, "not yet complete, and that perhaps never shall be complete". Just as truth is relatively apprehended, so is value or the good in its intrinsic form relatively realized. Moral perfection or absolute goodness as the ideal of finite personality lies in its fullest possibility in the nature and being of the Cosmic life of the world;

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that is to say in the being of God. This appears to me to be the essential implication of the objective realism of values. "God is that structure which sustains, promotes and constitutes supreme value. It may be infinite".(1) This is the faith of Wieman, the impersonal realist.

A value is instrumental when its worth is measured by its consequences, and not an end in itself; it is intrinsic when its worth stands on its own account, as an end in itself. Material values or values derived from things physical are instrumental; they serve as means to the realization of higher personal ends. Intrinsic values reside only in persons; they are consummatory values or ends in personal life realized in experience.(2)

Economic values: Wright and Wieman give economic value an intrinsic quality, not in the sense of the utility of things but in the attainment of skill and control of economic goods or material wealth. It is obvious that such an attainment as prudential economy in the control and production or increase of wealth is a personal value, especially in this capitalistic age; it would seem to be just as much intrinsic as the value derived in abstract rational thinking skill. It is an art of business life; and an art is an intrinsic end. "Life itself is impossible," says Wright, "without means of subsistence. Character does not reach its best development in dire want, with little opportunity for recreation and the enjoyment of friendship; nor can education, art, and religion thrive without economic support".(3) This clearly brings out

(1) H.N. Wieman; IL, 111-112.

(2) W.K. Wright; GIE, 338.

(3) Loc. cit., 338.

the relative importance of economic values in personal living.

Bodily, recreational and associational values: Physical vigor is an intrinsic condition for mental and conscious personal energy. "To have a symmetrical body", says Wright, "and to keep it in good condition is worth while for its own sake".(1) Playing for the sheer love of recreation is a great enjoyment in itself. And the associational values of friendship and comradeship, or the real love between mother and child, husband and wife, are values which give high degree of intrinsic enjoyment and happiness in personal life. These bodily, recreational, and associational values are instrumental as well as intrinsic, according to moral realists, for they further the development of a higher value, that is character.

Character or complete moral personality, therefore, is the ultimate intrinsic good. Aesthetic, intellectual and religious values are ends in themselves, integral parts of moral character; they are the interwoven factors that make moral character and whole personality. Each have their own autonomous wholeness, but interact with each other in a well proportioned or balanced personal life. Religious values are considered to be of preeminent importance in the making of the good life. Prayer, praise and worship are good in themselves; and divine communion is the highest form of love and blessedness. "Religion in general is reacting to something as though it were that to which all human life should be devoted. Religion of the sort we wish to advocate is dedicating

(1) Op.cit., 339.

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life in supreme devotion to that order of existence and possibility which provides the highest values which ever can be actualized".(1) This is Wieman's attitude that religious experience is a consummatory value of the highest order in human living; it is also affirmed by Wright when he says that "Love of God and service to humanity are indispensable aspects of the religious life; neither can be neglected without impairing the other".(2)

E. The Subjective Process in Value Experience.

Passing now from the objective and empirical aspects of value, let us at this point turn to the subjective or the organic basis of value experience. A. K. Rogers believes that man is a creature who is engaged primarily in the endeavor to satisfy his desires.(3) He implies, of course, that man's organic constitution or mental make up is so organized as to seek their objective expression or fulfillment, the satisfaction of instinctive or impulsive tendencies. Like other organisms, the human species must have satisfactions in order to live. These human satisfactions, however, include not only natural or biological fulfillments but much more important also moral and spiritual values. For man satisfaction is a "feeling state of enjoyment" and real satisfaction is attainable only as it "meets the full possibilities of human nature" including the demands upon intellectual approval and self-respect.(4) Moreover, the fact of feeling or emotion is an essential condition of value experience. It involves the

- (1) H.N. Wieman; IL, 135.
- (2) W.K. Wright; GIE, 343.
- (3) A.K. Rogers; TE, 43.
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organization of native tendencies or instincts.

The organic basis of satisfactions are, therefore, the native instincts and impulses. "An instinct is an inherited impulse, not so mechanistic as reflex but adaptable to different situations and subject to training".(1) Out of these instincts are developed habits, sentiments or emotions and character. And ~~an~~ impulse is an "enduring disposition of the human organism" imbedded in the structure of the brain and nervous system. They are sometimes active and other times inactive. They are aroused to action through stimulation either from without or from within the organism. They include appetites or desires calling for actions in order to "effect a more favorable change in the situation in which the person is placed". This is to say, they demand emotional satisfactions; and the degree of fulfillment and frustration determines the intensity or quality of the value experience. Goodness, rightness, and happiness are born empirically of successful or pleasant sensations and satisfactions; while their opposite disvalues come from failure to attain them which is followed by unpleasant effects to personal life; hence, disapproved. Wieman speaks of the process of "assimilation" in which "habitual responses fall into a system" and that this "is constantly developing into greater complexity". New impulses come in conflict with established habits and their assimilation establishes new and more complex habits or sentiments. The significance of this process is obvious. "This

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means the progressive organization of an ever more complex system of habits. This means coming into converse with ever more of the fullness of the world. This means progressive adaptation to an ever more ample environment, entering into a fuller life".(1)

F. Realization of Values: Standard of Moral Judgment.

According to religious realism, then, these complex instincts, impulses and their attending emotions are the basis of value experience, habits, sentiments and idealizations in conduct. "Assentiment is an organization, with reference to some object, of the most powerful and persistent human impulses....Every sentiment of every individual both helps to determine, and also is determined by, his character as a whole".(2) To put it briefly, character virtues depend upon the quality of these established sentiments or habits.

And now we may ask ourselves, "What are the underlying conditions in the actualization of values in life?" More plainly, how are the goods of life determined? This involves the theoretical consideration of moral judgments. How then does religious realism evaluate the goodness or evilness of experience? To answer this query, let us examine the realistic theories of moral judgments. Briefly, religious realism holds to the systematic approach in determining the nature of goodness. In other words, a moral judgment would include considerations of the elements of feeling, desire, will, purpose, reason and conscience which enter into moral experience.

(1)H.N.Wieman; RESM, 292.

(2)W.K.Wright; GIE, 212, 217.

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(1) H.W. Wiersma; *REEM*, 292.
(2) W.E. Wright; *GIL*, 212, 217.

These elements may be crystalized into such systems as eudaemonism, intuitionism, formalism, utilitarianism and rationalism.

1. Eudaemonism: Universal welfare and happiness.

The eudaemonistic system of Wright tends to be synthetic, leading toward a humanitarian social gospel with cosmic and religious world outlook. Eudaemonism is the attempt to combine and harmonize the different types of ethical criteria in the realization and apprehension of the moral good. According to this system, the good or "summum bonum" is identified with social welfare, universal happiness and well being, "the full and free development of all capacities, and the attainment of all value". It is a type of "perfectionism", universal utilitarianism or altruistic individualism.(1) It is characterized thus:

Eudaemonism is therefore intuitionist in its recognition of values, and teleological and empirical in its formulation of moral judgments. ...Seeks that social order which will be most favorable to the general attainment of individual welfare. A life of welfare is an active life; man finds his good in advancing with struggle and effort from lower to ever higher levels of attainment. It is also a happy life, since it is accompanied by the satisfaction that attends full and free expression of one's personality in harmony with others....Happiness accompanies the harmonious synthesis of all impulses and sentiments in a unity.(2)

This seems to me to be a plausible and commendable system of ethics; for after all life, if it means anything, is an active service, and one's individuality and usefulness is greatly if not wholly determined by his relationship and value ~~with the~~

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with the great society of persons.

2. Intuitionism: The element of feeling. If values have objective existence, as religious realists assert, then they may be apprehended a priori; and as a matter of fact, Wright claims that the mind "directly cognizes the distinction between good and evil much as it perceives the difference between blue and yellow or between identity and difference" in a sort of "direct realism".(1) To adopt Boodin's theory of transcendental consciousness as presented in chapter two, the self becomes aware of these values when they are brought into certain definitely organized situation in relation to its experience. This is the intuition of common sense guided by feeling and reflection; as "moral judgments are obvious to any one with reasonable intelligence".

One thing is quite clear; and that is, a critically trained mind attains the ^{power} of immediate or mystical apprehension of values whenever they are presented in perception or in definite situations. Rogers in his Theory of Ethics writes of "The Objectivity of the Moral Judgment" in which he states that to say "a desire is objectively good would mean---that the world---is so constituted that a certain object tends to call forth in me---a feeling of approval---this feeling lending a new shade of significance to the objective situation".(2) In an article in the International Journal of Ethics the same writer discusses "Feeling and the Moral Judgment" in which he declares that "A feeling is a part of the

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It seems obvious that "in ordinary affairs of life a man can trust his conscience and his common sense to tell him what it is that is right for him to do"; and although, as Wright claims, intuition can not afford a complete point of view in ethical life; yet intuitions have always put great emphasis on "purity of motives and integrity of character", and that there are certain moral axioms that can be apprehended intuitively.(2) Moral values are, in fact, first of all immediately experienced; and then critically evaluated afterwards "in the growing process of rationalizing human life". However much the standards of values and moral judgments are constructed by reason, feeling "still remains a determinant in the judgment" according to Rogers. Feeling in interaction with reason, in my opinion, constitutes the rational criterion of inner conscience which carries within

(1) A.K. Rogers; Int.Jr.Eth. 40(1929), 15-38.

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3. Formalism: Element of will, volition, freedom.

A third element in the systematic criterion of moral judgment is that of the will. This may be called the formal aspect of value judgment. Macintosh in The Reasonableness of Christianity has given a chapter to the consideration of freedom as the necessary implication of "Moral Optimism" or religiously moral meliorism which is "a fundamental attitude of confidence in the cosmos, together with a full sense of man's moral responsibility".(1) Moral optimism is to the author the highest aspiration of man; and herein lies the reasonableness of Christianity, for the highest ideals embraced by it are practicable, progressively realizable and will ultimately be conserved in the immortality of personality. Christian moral optimism expresses the conviction that "if only a person's will is right, he need have no fear of anything the universe can do to him; no absolute or final disaster can come to him whose will is steadfastly devoted to the true ideal".(2) Moral optimism requires an autonomous power within the will of the individual for spiritual self-direction and realization. And moral responsibility requires the freedom of will in volitional conduct. Man becomes moral only when he is free; and freedom is the reasonable basis and core of Christian

(1) D.C. Macintosh; RC, 26-63.

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In the first place, no morality can be regarded as fundamentally reasonable unless it is essentially free....And it ought to be quite evident that if this power of moral judgment is to be developed, the individual must be allowed freedom to use his own judgment in appreciating ends as good and observing what means are most effective in working toward good ends....It belongs essentially to Christianity to affirm whatever freedom is involved in moral responsibility.(1)

This, it is clear, gives emphasis on Christian formalism or the freedom of the will. Obviously, the essential character of true religion in general and Christianity in particular lies in the placing of importance to the autonomy of the inner life of will. Good will or righteousness is attained with divine grace, but it implies absolute freedom of choice in the shaping of the individual's moral life in conduct.

The fact of responsibility, then, for conduct and value is founded on the autonomy of the will. Freedom is the underlying presupposition of ethical life. It is what makes a man moral with power of self-determination.(2) Conduct or behavior acquires moral significance only when the subject is a free being. "If every thing that a man does were mechanically determined, like the rolling of a stone downhill, logically we could neither praise nor blame him for anything that he did, nor pass a moral judgment of any kind of him".(3) Freedom is inseparable with moral responsibility. Man is clearly the moral sovereign of his own personality; and the character of his life is determined by the free choices he makes as directed by his autonomous will.

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Wright, however, criticizes the Kantian "categorical imperative" sense of duty making a thing good simply because it is willed and therefore morally binding regardless of any element of value or consequences. He recognizes, nevertheless, the two-fold aspect in Kant's formalism which he accepts as very fundamental for empirical morality. The first aspect is the implication of the universality of the good will which is that we ought to act always in a manner harmonious with an ideal of what human society ought to be. The second aspect is the principle of social justice which is that we ought to judge ourselves and others impartially. Realism holds that if formalism is stripped from any consideration of pragmatic consequences, it becomes an empty category of existence. This is the substance of Wieman's criticism of purely formal idealism in an article entitled, "Objectives Versus Ideals".(1) "For the most part", he declares, "tradition and illusion have shaped all our living....The most popular ideals about which we hear most talk, belong with the illusions". This is to say that we often will the ideal, but in our daily experiences we either forget or ignore them. In such case ideals truly become mere illusions, or formal emptiness. The inner motive of the will must find its objective expression or pragmatic consistency in the realm of empirical values as well as in the subjective realm of logical ideals. The pragmatic value of ideals, nevertheless, is recognized by religious realists.

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Boodin thinks that psychologically the will is related to the organism in the sense that it is the organization of instincts and impulses focused through interest and dynamically guided by intention toward a certain definite line of activity. Ethically, on the other hand, the will is controlled by reason and feeling which together make up a rational or critical conscience. He says:

So far as the modes of will are concerned, these can only be known as they unfold themselves in its selective reactions. Each instinct reveals a fundamental mode of will---a theme which is organized in ever greater complexity through its racial and individual development. It becomes the will to sympathize, the will to know, and so on through its varying and complex motifs. If the will is dependent upon a physical world and its contents for its realization, it is in turn the reaction of the will which makes meaning and value of life possible.(1)

4. Teleological utilitarianism: Element of purpose. It follows that motivation is an important element in value experience or personal life. The real problem is "What is man purpose in life?" Or, what is man's objective? The will without some reference to purposive intentions or motives and ends is without meaning. The will must, then, have inherent and practical objectives, besides transcendental ideals. It must have some real workable plan of realizable moral life, or "some satisfaction which is maintained and may be increased by those activities which we call living". To live humanly is to engage in the purposive and progressive organization of an ever more complex system of habits by which one reacts to an ever larger portion of the world and its purposes.(2)

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The world or the real universe is created for a purpose; such teleological nature of reality is the fundamental revelation of "Cosmic Evolution". The world is not a mere mechanism, as was shown in chapter one, but a world that has a purposive mind directing and perfecting mechanical and spiritual laws. This is the "new teleology" which implies that there is creativity in the cosmic activity that transcends mechanical processes in nature.(1) "Conduct is free only when it is a consequence of a systematic purpose", says Boodin; and man's moral endeavor is the development of those forms of conduct by which he purposely and freely adjusts himself to a great complexity of processes round about him and thus fulfills the objectives of a more abundant life. Conduct is moral, says Rogers, just in so far as it integrates the purposes of the individual with the purposes of his group, and ultimately with all mankind.(2)

Life's purpose or objective, then, according to Wieman, is the progressive transformation of inner feelings, desires and will into actual values or possibilities of living. This in substance is the teleological nature of moral experience. He holds that one of the main factors in the realization of the "maximum energy" is finding a "life-purpose". Wright, moreover, clearly states that:

When the activity of life are organized under the sovereignty of one supreme devotion, each activity supports the others, inner conflicts and friction are removed, maximum stimulus is operative, all habits pull together and distractions are excluded, and, if the purpose is of high sort,

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cooperative adjustment to the environment is promoted.(1)

This is, to empirical realism, the essential dynamic function of religion in the attainment of a growing moral life, a purposive and passionate devotion to the supreme source of infinite values, which is God.

5. Scientific Rationalism: Element of reason. By far the most important aspect in value experience, according to religious realism, is the element of reason or the scientific attitude in the determination of what is good and virtuous, and in the control of personal impulses, desires, and purposes. In order to be ethical, the individual's feelings, will and purposes must be rational. That seems to me to be a truism; for the interaction and integration of these feelings and purposes in proper order imply definite type of control. This is rational control. Conduct, then, in order to be moral must be consistent and harmonious with experience and reality as a whole. "A rational decision in moral situation implies a coordination of all the instincts and emotions involved....Reason in morality is closely related to volition. Each implies the coordination of impulses and sentiments in response to the whole self. Spinoza thought of will and reason as identical; while for Kant the will is the practical reason, i.e. reason in conduct".(2)

Doubtlessly, conflicts do arise in the feeling of obligation, desire and purpose; reason must enter into the experience as the harmonizer and synthecizer or discriminator

(1)H.N.Wieman; IL, 2-28; 85-100.

(2)W.K.Wright; GIE, 270-2.

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of the objectives of moral judgments or conduct. Reason is the constant factor in the making of rational or critical conscience, the counsellor of the will and the accountant of desires. The voice of conscience, it seems to me, is ethically binding or imperative only when it implies reason or divine revelation. For intuition is but a short cut process of reason to truth, a mystical and vivid apprehension of truth and reality. Experience without reason means a life of chaos and devoid of real meaning and value. This is consistent with the religious realistic attitude that "To live intelligently in a world as complex and rapidly changing as ours, requires that we constantly solve the problem of how to act in a new situation in such a way as to achieve the best possibilities of value which it may have to offer".(1) In other words, the "blind urge" of life, feelings, intuitions, desires and vivid impulses must find intelligent interpretation and rational control in conduct or in the "art of life".

G. The Reasonableness of Christian Morality.

To crystalize the substance of this chapter we may say that it has set forth the essential elements in the ethics of religious realism that have direct bearing on the making of moral experience and personal character. The system may be characterized as realistic, objective and empirical in its conception of value; and synthetic and rational in its ethical principles. It is also idealistic in the sense that religious realism recognizes the practical value of ideals and the prime

(1)H.N.Wieman; IL, 12.

of the objectives of moral judgments on conduct. Reason is the constant factor in the making of rational or ethical conscience, the conscience of the will and the accompaniment of desires. The voice of conscience, it seems to me, is ethically binding or imperative only when it implies reason or divine revelation. For intuition is but a short cut process of reason to truth, a mystical and vivid apprehension of truth and reality. Experience without reason seems a life of chaos and devoid of real meaning and value. This is consistent with the religious realistic attitude that "to live intelligently in a world as complex and rapidly changing as ours, requires that we constantly solve the problem of how to act in a new situation in such a way as to achieve the best possibilities of value which it may have to offer." (1) In other words, the "blind urge" of life, feelings, intuitions, desires and vivid impulses must find intelligent interpretation and rational control in conduct or in the "art of life".

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importance of the spiritual life. Hence, it may be said, religious realism is consistent with Christian principles. And from another point of view Christianity finds its ethical justification in the moral philosophy of religious realism.

The supreme validity, value and importance of Christian morality, according to Macintosh in his book, The Reasonableness of Christianity, lies in its essential character of being rational and eminently practical and intelligible. True morality, he explicitly declares, must be reasonable. That is to say, it must have in it a rational ideal and objective, it must be conducive to freedom and empirically practical, it must lead to spiritual values individual and social. Essential Christianity is reasonable and true because in its structure and function it gives due provision for freedom and appeals to experience; and because its principles and ideals are thoroughly spiritual and social; it is in full accord with right judgment and reason.(1) "In fact we are in a position to say", he further declares, "that a morality that is truly free, empirical, spiritual, and social is reasonable; and since, as we have seen, essential Christianity in its morality is free, empirical, spiritual, and social, we are entitled to conclude that Christian morality is reasonable, universally valid, and permanently true".(2)

(1) D. G. Macintosh; RC, 26-39

(2) Ibid, 39.

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CHAPTER V.

VIRTUOUS LIFE AND THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM.

Moral experience has been reconsidered in the last chapter in the light of the religious realistic ethics or the theory of value and moral judgment in relation to experience and moral character. With regard to the nature of value we noted among other things two essential aspects; first, its objective reality both in its instrumental and intrinsic forms; and second, its empirical realization in personal experience which involved the consideration of instincts, impulses, and sentiments in terms of individual and social need, interest and satisfaction. And with regard to moral judgment we noted that religious realism holds to the synthetic system in the determination of the highest good as the object of personal and social conduct. This involved the consideration of social welfare, intuition, freedom, purpose and reason. Each of these, together with their implications, contributes to the right criterion of moral judgment or the guide to moral experience. We also added, as an appendix to the chapter, that Christian ethics stands the test of the highest degree of reasonableness and practicality.

We are, in this chapter, concerned with the significance of religion in virtuous living. Morality has to do with ideals of conduct, declares Macintosh, whereas religion in the ordinary sense of the term has to do with man's relation to

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We are, in this chapter, concerned with the significance of religion in virtuous living. Morality has to do with ideals of conduct, declares MacIntosh, whereas religion in the ordinary sense of the term has to do with man's relation to

to the Supreme Being.(1) To his way of thinking moral optimism is the highest level and possibility of human aspiration; it is man's highest endeavor to conserve actual values and ideals, and to readjust or integrate his life in accordance with his ideals. But man as a finite being has his limitations while his aspirations take flight beyond actual human possibilities. For the satisfaction of these aspirations, Macintosh thinks, there must be also a spiritual or religious optimism. Moral optimism is the preparation of the soul for the reception of the higher and unrealized spiritual values of divine creation. This is expressed in his conception of God as the necessary implication of the moral life and personal immortality:

If moral optimism is valid and there is an attitude and adjustment on our part which, when fulfilled, justifies freedom from anxiety about what is beyond our power and brings an inward or spiritual preparedness for anything that can happen to us, it logically follows that there must be among or above the powers at work in the world a Dependable Factor, conserving all absolute spiritual values beyond what man as a physically embodied and limited creature is able to do. This Power must be the ultimate power with which man has to do, the object of absolute dependence, and must be great enough and good enough---favorable enough to human values---to effect for man what man imperatively needs to have done, if he is to be justified in remaining a moral optimist.(2)

This is in substance religious realism and its relation to moral realism is expressed thus:

Conservation of the essential values of the religious consciousness requires that the Object of man's absolute worship and dependence be regarded as the realization of ideal perfection,

(1) D.D. Macintosh; RC, 40.

(2) Ibid, 75.

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From this it is to be noted, then, that true morality which makes for human virtue must be essentially religious in order for man to attain the greatest possible good in life. Religion, therefore, is an essential factor in the moral or virtuous life; for religion supplies the satisfactions of man's aspiration for the "more-than-human" values, values which only the divine can create and conserve.

A. Nature of Virtue: Relation to Value and Character.

Let us now for a moment turn to the consideration of virtue as religious realism interprets it, and try to determine its relation to moral character and the problem it creates for religion.

All virtues are human values. Value and virtue represent two points of view.(2) Value in general is of the objective relation of things and persons in the social environment; while virtue is the established character of the behavior or conduct of the self in realizing that value. Value belongs to the objective character of reality and virtue to the subjective moral quality of the individual person.

A virtue, then, is a moral value in terms of personal

(1) Op.cit., 78-9.

(2) A.K.Rogers; TE, 160-176. W.K.Wright; GIE, 343-350.

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integration or traits of man; it is a type of character recognized as conducive to the interest of individual and social good, and capable of social approval. Wright conceives virtue in terms of sentiments; while others such as Wieman interpret it as an approved type of adjustment, or interaction. In any case it serves the good life, the rational control of tendencies, desires and will. "All virtues are sentiments", declares Wright, "and imply an habitual organization of impulses toward some object. Being sentiments, all virtues are acquired, and none are innate. Virtues are never attained without effort....They all imply thoughtful recognition and appraisal of personal traits".(1)

Sentiments may and often does become religious in their attitudes; that is, individuals adjust their lives in terms of their personal faith, beliefs, loyalties, aspirations and ideals regarding God or the Supreme Controller of the universe, and hence all personal virtues ^{are} ~~as~~ dedicated to this religious ideal. In his A Student's Philosophy of Religion Wright declares clearly the significance of the religious sentiment. He says:

A sentiment is an organization of instinctive tendencies in response to a given object that calls them into activity....The various sentiments, taken together, constitute the character of a man. ...The religious sentiment has for its primary object, the Agency (God) through which the conservation of socially recognized values (or virtues) is sought....As conservation of the higher moral values is sought through God, all the emotions and sentiments connected with them also unite with the religious sentiments. Among these would be included

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Personality, then, or the character of the individual self is the synthesis of all the virtues; hence, the problem of morality and religion is the progressive harmonization and coordination of all the sentiments into the unity of life. Religion, according to religious realism, offers the adequate Object for the most powerfull and unifying sentiment. This is God; and Macintosh believes that this religious object must be taken in terms of Ideal Personality. He declares:

What is meant is that the God of moral optimism, however superpersonal he may possibly be in some unknown and unimaginable sense, is most reasonably thought of as at least personal in the sense of being conscious, intelligent, purposive, working consciously and rationally toward an end in which the conservation of human personality and values is included. Furthermore, such an essentially personal God, working dependably for such an ideal end, always adequate for man's absolute dependence and trust, must be regarded as completely moral, perfect in holiness and in self-giving love.(2)

Belief in a personal God is, to Macintosh, an essential part of or an implication in the reasonableness of moral and religious optimism; and such belief is consistent with the reasonableness of "essential" Christianity.

B. The Objectivity and Classification of Virtues.

Wright believes that although human virtues or the standards of virtue do change and develop through the process of evolution, there are nevertheless certain intuitively perceived objectives, permanent standards or cardinal virtues.

(1)W.K.Wright; SPR, 220-223.

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For as values have objective character so their corresponding virtues also have their distinct objectivity in the character and goodness of the Cosmic Consciousness and Will.(1) And to follow the thought of Macintosh, absolute and eternal virtues are in reality in the personality of God. Each virtue is theoretically autonomous and consistent with one another, and in a sense they "overlap" or interpenetrate. "Perfect possession of any virtue would mean inclusion of all, in a completely unified and coherent personality".(2)

Virtues may be classified according to Rogers in terms of the rational demands of the intellect, the objectives of the will, and the conditions of the social environment.(3) The formal demands of the intellect are the virtues of clear thinking, with sincerity and vision; openmindedness; and a sense of proportion with reasonable simplicity. The virtues in terms of the inner will are loyalty to the rational ideal and obligation; courage with self-control; and conscientiousness in the performance of tasks. The virtues in terms of the social environment are business prudence or economy; justice, granting every man his due opportunity of self-development; benevolence which calls for a righteous assistance to others who are necessarily in need of such assistance, or justice plus love; and self-respect which calls for the preservation and development of personal dignity and worth. The "Summum Bonum" is, therefore, the rational cultivation and harmony of all these distinct virtues in the making of personality.(4)

(1) W.K.Wright; GIE, 224-5.

(2) Ibid, 225.

(3) A.K.Rogers; TE, 160-176.

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Similarly, Wright sets forth the various cardinal virtues and defines them showing their distinctions:

1. Moral courage: This is a firm attitude or stand by what is believed to be right in the face of any danger or opposition without foolhardiness.

2. Honor: This is the cultivation and preservation of the dignity of personality with regard to social respect.

3. Temperance: This is the rational control, not denial, of impulses with respect to the satisfactions of the self in relation to the good of society.

4. Justice: This is the rendering to every one his due opportunity for self-development and for fulfilling personal obligations.

5. Love or benevolence: This calls for tenderness, sympathy and comradeship with family, neighbor and to all mankind; to render them more than justice demands. While justice calls forth a passive attitude, love is an active service.

6. Loyalty: This is love expressed with reference to the social unit; the rational control of sentiments felt towards the social group to which one belongs or to a social ideal such as country, patriotism, and God.

7. Economy: This is the rational control and appropriation of property and wealth in the enrichment of spiritual life individual and social.

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7. Economy: This is the rational control and appropriation of property and wealth in the enrichment of spiritual life individual and social.

8. Wisdom: This is the virtue of conscientious and honest criticism and comparative appraisal of all values as ends and means in the search for the greatest possible goods.

9. Respect: This is a rational regard for the rights of personality, self and other selves.

10. Reverence: This is a personal respect toward a Being superior to man, God "who arouses in him complex emotions of admiration, awe, love, and gratitude, and also probably, of mystic rapture and devoted loyalty".

C. The Significance and Function of Religion .

It is clearly apparent that the foregoing cardinal virtues are consistent with the objectives of religion; they are to my mind and judgment essentially the objectives of Christianity. Religion, says the religious realist, always has a moral purpose. It seeks the realization of the highest values through worship, communion and fellowship with God. The values which religion endeavors to conserve coincide with ~~with~~ the highest moral values that are known, but much more than mere moral values.(1) The function of religion, according to realism, necessarily involves moral values as shown by ^{the} ~~its~~ definition of the nature of religion:

Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency.(2)

(1) W.K.Wright; SPR, 54-5.

(2) Ibid, 47, 214.

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This is Wright's definition, and there are three essential elements involved: First, the conservation of value. The term conservation is used here to include also the production and increase of values following the thought of Höffding.⁽¹⁾ Second, the worship of a superhuman power or agency which is God. And third, man's absolute dependence on this divine Power in the endeavor to conserve socially recognized values. In the course of a man's religious experience, Wright declares convincingly, "he gains these values and makes them a part of his self, through what he believes to be a divine aid".⁽²⁾

To follow further the train of Wright's realistic thought, he claims that all religions contain the essential elements of the definition. In fact his survey of ancient and comparative religions in his A Student's Philosophy of Religion is painstakingly made to corroborate this view; he finds, however, the highest and completest fulfillment in the nature and function of the religion of Jesus. What Christianity has endeavored to conserve are:

1. The ethical inwardness, which is the supreme Christian value, which requires inner change of life and will, or reconstructing the integration of personality into the likeness of the personality of Jesus.

2. The purification of the home and the sexual life, which demands spiritual interpretation of human and institutional relationship.

3. The humanitarian attitude which places

(1) H. Höffding; The Philosophy of Religion, b, 209-271
 (2) Op.cit., 214. Macmillan, 1914.

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emphasis on the virtue of love as the central core of the principle of human brotherhood.

4. The principle of social justice or the recognition of free individuals and democratic institutions. The essential function of Christianity, then, is "to set before men the matchless personality of Jesus Christ, a personality from whom men may gain a fuller appreciation of moral values, and a reinforcement of their wills so that they may be able to realize these values in their lives.(1)

In regard to the life of the Christian Church Wright says:

The whole history of Christianity may be interpreted as a record of the different ways in which men of different ages have worshipped God through Christ, and so have learned to live on a high spiritual level. To live on this level is the experience which they have called an assurance of salvation and redemption.(2)

In moral experience, moreover, or in the virtuous life the religious object of worship and prayer has an internal relation with human consciousness or the self.(3) This is to say, the voice of God speaks from within; and the character of God or the Supreme Value of life is manifest, though finitely, in human personality through religious experience. The infinite that is beyond is within. "With the inspiration of this immanent God working within them, men are rapidly mastering the harsh conditions of their physical environment, gradually achieving mutual love and justice in social organizations, and slowly rising to finer heights of individual character.(4)

(1) Op.cit., 199-204.

(2) Ibid, 205.

(3) ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Ibid, 388-390.

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(2) Ibid., 205.

(3) ~~Wright~~ Ibid., 288-290.

(4) Op. cit., 202.

The most absorbingly interesting and humanly popular presentation of religious realism in the course of my reading is given by Wieman in his three volumes; namely, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, Religious Experience and Scientific Method, and The Issues of Life. I can not hope to give a very full treatment of these works here for obvious reasons. To give a mere brief summary of them would not do fair justice to the stimulus and interest they evoke in me, and yet with apology that is just what I propose to do.

Wieman interprets religion and the nature of God from the impersonalistic point of view. God is personal in the sense that it (1) or he possesses integrating powers such as found in human personality. But, Wieman argues, God is more than personal. God is defined in terms of the greatest value in existence, or possibility:

But God is that order of existence and possibility by virtue of which the greatest possible good is truly a possibility and can be achieved by human effort....Human can be ~~so~~ efficacious in bringing a desired possibility to pass only when there is some order in which and with which men can work to that end. All this applies to the possibility of greatest value....God is that one order which sustains and mediates the possibilities of greatest value.(2)

God, in other words, is the existent reality of the highest order of value and not to be identified with the subjective consciousness of an ideal which is of human intellectual construction. The nature of this divinity is essentially Love; "this order of greatest value is the order of communication," a principle of interaction in adjustive behavior

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(2) H. W. Wieman: *IL*, 102.

among human beings "in which each individual finds in all his living the meaning and the value of the whole march of life". Progressive integration ~~and~~ ^{or} interaction of values is the manifest presence of God in life processes.(1) This order of value and interaction may be conceived, as Wieman thinks, as personality, for personality is an order of value; or it may be taken as a system of values, in which case ^{it} is more than personal.(2)

Religion or religious experience, therefore, is the endeavor of man to seek God or to find "that order of existence and possibility which includes the possibilities of greatest value", or to find that adjustment to God which will yield the "maximum security and abundance to all human living".(3) The heart of religious devotion is in the creativity of worship, and Wieman's characterization of worship is this:

The greatest creative enthusiasm of which human life is capable can be awakened only when a man gives his whole attention to the object which is, in fact, the condition of greatest enrichment to all human living. Only as man exposes himself to the full stimulus of this object can his utmost capacity for response be awakened. This attitude toward the most important object in the universe is worship. And worship is the heart of religion. From it arises the largest creative endeavor humanly possible.(4)

Let us now sum up the place of religion in the moral life as interpreted by Wieman:

1. The art of religious living is the progressive conservation and increase of moral values. This is not merely gathering together the values or traditions of the past

(1) Op.cit., 176.

(2) Ibid, 137.

(3) H.N.Wieman; RESM, 381; IL, 169.

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Let us now sum up the place of religion in the moral

life as interpreted by Wieman:

1. The art of religious living is the progressive conservation and increase of moral values. This is not merely gathering together the values or traditions of the past

and present, but an exploration into the beyond for the highest spiritual values not yet attained but possible of attainment. Conservation is creative endeavor. "To be conservative is to conserve the good which the past has achieved. To be progressive is to add to that good....Hence one must be conservative in order to the progressive".(1)

2. The organization of the totality of habits under the dynamic control of the religious sentiment: This is the function of worship as means of successful living. It requires in the first place, the exposure of the self to God in confession, communion, and devotion; and in the second place, the reconstruction of personal traits in accordance with revealed ideals and objectives.(2)

3. The social and religious adjustment for the greatest good: This is the process of eliminating the ills of life. "Religion has always claimed to be the preventive or cure....It has stood as a preventive in the sense that it has so equipped man that he could adjust himself to situation in such a way as to escape the three-fold evils of social wrongdoing, mental misery and impoverishment of life". This is regeneration and orientation.(3) Religion offers salvation, the progressive fulfillment of the deepest spiritual and moral needs of human nature which religious experience alone can attain.

4. The power of vision: Perhaps the greatest of all that religion accomplishes in human or virtuous living

(1) H.N. Wieman; WRT, 48.

(2) Ibid, 79.

(3) Ibid, 113.

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(1) W. A. Wilson; Writ., 40.
(2) Ibid., 79.
(3) Ibid., 113.

is the power of vision it gives to the worshipper. To this Wieman expresses perhaps his own religious experience when he says:

There is a beauty which will glorify all the ways of the world when we make those adjustments which are required for maximum aesthetic appreciation and artistic achievement. There is a measure of control over all the forces of nature and over all the conditions of human happiness which will be ours as soon as we make those scientific and other intellectual adjustments which are required. And there is an intellectual comprehension of the magnificent sweep of the intricate universal process through time and space, which is an added good to be attained through thinking, over and above that control of nature which science affords. And there is a creative intercourse of minds, a love, cooperation and mutual understanding, that will yield unimaginable joy when we make the required social and moral adjustments.(1)

Such is Wieman's "apocalyptic" vision of the Kingdom of God, of the highest order of ethical utopia or earthly heaven or adjusted personalities through divine interaction and human cooperation. This is the religious vision, and its power over the human soul is expressed thus:

The religious man is stirred with this vision, is given assurance and peace by it, is inspired by it to reconstruct our human way of living with respect to personal habits, social organization and intellectual, artistic, aesthetic and moral endeavors, to the end of making those adjustments which will enable God to fill our lives with the good which may be ours. This is the method of religion.(2)

Religion, then, is a process of reconstruction, and readjustment of the moral life, with the help and guidance of the supernatural Power.

(1) Op.cit., 130-1.

(2) Op.cit., 131-2.

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SUMMARY

Thus we have followed the flight of moral experience into the field of religious realism. The journey has been long, but in fair weather. Let us now review comprehensively the scenes through which we have travelled with experience viewing the real world and the life within it through the perspective insights of religious realists.

We have seen that, as experience travels and opens its eyes into the wide open world of metaphysical reality, there is presented the real universe itself with a divine teleological character. From one point of view experience sees the teleological integration between man and the cosmos; from another point of view there is the recognition of the two distinct but related processes--the psychical and the physical; and from a still another point of looking at reality, with a keener vision and more analytic as well as poetic mind, the universe presents itself with the divine five-fold truths such as being, space, time, form, and consciousness. All of these make up this one dynamic world of triadic realism, physical, personal and divine realism. Moreover, experience spies the realm of essence, which is sometimes known as subsistence, in which there is revealed the precipice of error and illusion.

Then, suddenly, experience becomes aware of itself as consciousness, and as an integral part of the real world. It finds on the earthly planet three chief types of thought regarding the nature of consciousness. One type is called

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We have seen that, as experience travels and opens its eyes into the wide open world of metaphysical reality, there is presented the real universe itself with a divine theological character. From one point of view experience sees the theological interaction between man and the cosmos; from another point of view there is the recognition of the two distinct but related processes--the psychological and the physical; and from a still another point of looking at reality, with a keener vision and more analytic as well as poetic mind, the universe presents itself with the divine five-fold truths such as being, space, time, form, and consciousness. All of these make up this one dynamic world of triadic realism, physical, personal and divine realism. Moreover, experience sees the realm of essence, which is sometimes known as subsistence, in which there is revealed the precipice of error and illusion.

Then, suddenly, experience becomes aware of itself as consciousness, and as an integral part of the real world. It finds on the earthly planet three chief types of thought regarding the nature of consciousness. One type is called

subjectivism which finds in consciousness the only reality; another type is called objectivism which finds that consciousness "ought" to be applied to the observable behavior of the natural and organic world without the necessity of postulating a mysterious psychic mind within and behind the real physical universe. A third type is the mediating school manifesting in critical realism and objective idealism, both of which recognize more or less the reality of both consciousness or the realm of spirit and nature or the realm of matter. Among the critical realists there is the group of religious realists who recognize the independent real existence of both mind and matter. Religious realism is found to interpret consciousness as a form of potential energy, as a universal condition of personal life, and as a psychic process in terms of the creative activity of the mind, finite and Cosmic.

Examining consciousness further, experience finds that it is differentiated into individual selves both finite and divine; and this differentiation is brought about by the complex integration and unified organization of psychophysical organisms capable of internal and external adjustment to the environment and to the cosmic universe. The individual self may be taken in terms of the "empirical me" or being in conduct; or in terms of the totality of personality including both the waking consciousness and the unconscious mental organization of personal life. Experience, then, becomes conscious of its own personality and its infinite possibilities

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through its dual nature--physical and mental--interacting within itself for certain obvious personal ends.

Then as we follow experience in the search for truth, we note that knowledge is an objective attainment which contributes to the moral growth of personality. Experience finds in common sense the basis or the first step toward real knowledge and truth; it implies both the creativity of mind and the objectivity of truth. This is to say that truth is attained through subjective logical consistency within the individual mind, and through the objective process of finding in the real world the identity or correspondence of inner experience. Having determined what constitutes relative truth by way of reconstructive dualism and synthetic monism, experience finds that the truth experience has pragmatic and practical value. It provides the scientific attitude in the realm of morals and religion. Only when critical, scientific and experimental methods are applied that moral and religious principles and beliefs find their validity and truth.

Inspired by a glimpse of the truth, experience raises its wings and explores the higher realms of values. Exercising its intuitive powers, experience discovers that values are objectively inherent in the real universe, and that they are there awaiting to be realized or taken up into meaningful personal conduct. It also finds that these values may be grouped into instrumental and intrinsic values; and

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that the ultimate intrinsic value is moral character including intellectual, aesthetic and religious values. Character values are realized through organic and personal integration, individual and social; and also through taking into consideration a system of moral judgment involving social welfare, intuition, autonomy of the will, utilitarian purpose and critical reason. Reflecting on Christianity for a moment, experience learns that Christian ethics possesses the highest degree of reasonableness and practicality.

Realizing the meaning and significance of moral values in itself and in the world, experience then proceeds to apply them to itself in the development of its character or virtuous living. It explores and tests the ideal virtues such as courage, honor, temperance, justice, love, loyalty, ~~e~~ economy, wisdom, respect and reverence; and finds them all good in themselves and that the real virtuous life is attained in the harmonious integration of all these ideals. To the problem of how successfully to conserve, increase and integrate harmoniously these virtues, experience finds solution and guidance through worship and religious experience or cosmic aspiration. Experience finds in religion the most dynamic and creative integrating power. This lies in the nature of God ^{which} is essentially Love and the Supreme Good.

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
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